A Chinese Lesson for New Orleans (and elsewhere) by Dunstan, Helen & at the University of Sydney, Professor of Chinese Studies
A Chinese Lesson for New Orleans (and elsewhere) 
HELEN DUNSTAN* 
You don't need to know anything about Chinese history to understand 
this lecture. But as I am going to plunge you into the detail of famine-
relief administration, you will have an easier time if you know that 
in the eighteenth century China was ruled by the Qing dynasty, 
which meant a Manchu emperor and a mixture of Chinese and 
Manchu officials in the upper echelons of government. China Proper 
was divided into eighteen provinces, which may be thought of as 
territories approximating to the size of France. The major subdivisions 
of the provinces were called prefectures; below the prefecture were 
jurisdictions that, strictly speaking, should be called county-level 
units, although I will just call them counties. It is conventional to use 
the term 'county magistrate' for the official in charge of all aspects of 
county government. 
A quasi-tsunami struck the Chinese coast near Shanghai in August 
1747 and caused massive damage up the Yangzi estuary and far 
inland. At first sight, the regional authorities seem to have done even 
worse than their recent counterparts in New Orleans in terms of the 
tardiness of their response. To be sure, the Provincial Administration 
Commissioner drafted twenty-one instructions to make sure that all 
the county magistrates knew what to do. He forwarded them to his 
superior for approval before he sent them out - and that was over 
three weeks after the onset of the disaster. It took his superior another 
five days to approve them, and then it may have been another six 
before they went out. This was far too late to be ordering the delivery 
of emergency rations to people who were cut off by floodwater on 
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the high ground where they had taken refuge. Perhaps, however, 
the point was both to order help for those who were still stranded, 
and to validate more prompt initiatives already taken by those 
same local officials who had reported that they had launched the 
usual procedures. The intention may have been to reassure these 
officials that they need not fear censure for having used state funds 
to provide food in a form suitable for people who had no cooking 
equipment with them - a more expensive proposition than letting 
heads of peasant households collect supplies of raw grain that would 
last a month. 
True, it is harder to rationalise the late instructions for the retrieval 
and economical disposal of the corpses of the drowned. Would there 
be immunity for officials who had already used state funds to pay 
for coffins, as opposed to reed mats, for' floating corpses' that were 
not claimed for burial by relatives? What were the implications 
for public health if some local officials waited to be told that they 
should urgently arrange for corpses to be hauled out of the receding 
floodwaters? The point I want to stress, though, is that it is not that 
the local authorities did not know what to do when a disaster struck. 
The instructions from on high make sense only on the assumption that 
relief procedures were understood by county magistrates in a general 
way, but that clarification on points of detail was thought necessary 
as the authorities faced the challenge of minimising homelessness 
and hunger after an exceptionally destructive flood. 
I will focus not on the relief effort following the quasi-tsunami, but 
on a subject on which we are better informed: the floods that started 
in July the previous year in a much poorer region further north 
- floods caused by excessive rainfall. We know so much about the 
1746 floods because a sub-provincial official known as an intendant 
left his collected working papers from the period when he was 
seconded to supervise relief in a tranche of territory that comprised 
three counties: from north to south, Pizhou, Xiuqian, and Taoyuan. I 
would like to acknowledge the work of a team at Renmin University 
in making available a typeset, punctuated version of this collection, 
which I shall hereafter call' the casebook'. 1 It offers revealing glimpses 
into the world of a senior official striving to balance correct bureaucratic 
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procedure with prompt, meticulous attention to the pressing needs of 
over 800,000 flood victims, those of the aforesaid counties, which were 
only three of the ten worst-stricken jurisdictions. Clearly, the imperial 
state was implementing a massive relief operation. 
I will highlight a few noteworthy features of the approach to flood 
relief reflected in the casebook. This part of the paper will remind 
us that the commitment and capacity to save lives on a vast scale 
were no less a triumph of premodern Chinese civilisation than Tang 
poetry and porcelain; my concluding reflections will take as starting 
point the common instinct to characterise certain features of imperial 
Chinese governance as 'surprisingly modern'. After considering 
the assumptions about the nature of modernity that this instinct 
presumably reflects, I shall note the potential of historical research 
to liberate normative discussions about the state-society relationship 
from the ideological fetters of the last two centuries. In a world that 
does not seem to be postmodern, but whose islands of prosperity are 
threatened by massive ecological collapse, a redefinition of civilisation 
to include rational disaster-preparedness and institutionally-based 
humanitarianism would hardly be gratuitous. I shall also make some 
shallow observations on the theme of human rights. 
Let me first comment on the magnitude of the disaster. Documents 
included in the casebook tell of lakes, rivers and the Grand Canal 
bursting their banks, of dykes and sluice gates being overwhelmed, 
unleashing sudden torrents. Homes collapsed; crops in the low-lying 
fields were inundated; even the crops on higher ground were harmed 
by the excessive rainfall. As late as September, the desolate scene that 
the provincial governor surveyed by boat in a less badly stricken region 
still featured numerous flood victims camping wretchedly along the 
dykes, having seen their crops submerged, homes destroyed, and 
domestic grain stores and everyday utensils all 'swept clean away'. 
A seventeenth-century image, of peasants salvaging whatever wheat 
they could, reminds us of the need for restoration of the agricultural 
environment, a process to which, in the eighteenth century, the state 
often contributed - by mobilising labour to dig drainage channels, 
directing wealthy landlords to issue seed grain to their tenants, and 
lending seeds to poorer farmers. By some time in October, winter 
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wheal had been sown on a proportion of the stricken acreage that 
ranged from 20 to 70 percent. The question is, how was the labour 
force enabled to survive to plant the seeds, and how would it survive 
while they were growing? The answer, to a very large extent, is state 
assistance. 
The core of the relief effort was an emergency feeding and shelter 
program, followed by a period of planned, means-tested distributions 
that I will refer to as the winter feeding program. Much of the detail in 
the casebook concerns the latter stage, when peasants would receive 
subsistence support for a number of winter months that varied with 
their assessed need. Need was assessed through two surveys: one 
survey assigned a percentage disaster rating to each field, and the 
other classified all eligible peasant households as either 'extremely 
poor' or 'poor, but less so'. Even for the neediest beneficiaries, the 
winter subsistence program would not start till mid-October, and 
so for most recipients there would be a gap between the end of the 
emergency program and the beginning of winter relief. Deplorable 
as this must seem, the statistics generated by the planning process 
bespeak a most impressive level of commitment. 
'Very poor' 'Very poor' 'Less poor' 'Less poor' 
adults children adults children Total 
Pizhou 37,766 26,897 175,131 108,952 348,746 
Xiuqian 43,979 18,242 156,323 47,206 265,750 
Taoyuan 40,432 21,963 106,388 51,111 219,894 
Total 122,177 67,102 437,842 207,269 834,390 
Table 1 
The number of persons assessed as eligible for relief in the three 
counties, broken down by degree of household poverty and adult or 
child status is in total 834,000: over 560,000 adults and approaching 
275,000 children. And even these figures are incomplete. 
What resources would the government commit to feeding all 
these people? The statements of expenditure to date and anticipated 
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future cost received in late October are incumplete in Lhe sensE'S 
(a) that not all counties reported all their costs, and (b) that further 
costs were to be incurred by a later decision that the period of relief 
should be extended. The figures are inconsistent also in that units are 
different: some are stated in taels (Chinese ounces) of silver, others 
in Chinese bushels of grain. Fortunately, a 1:1 conversion rate was 
being assumed, so we can simply speak of 'tael-equivalent units' 
(TEUs). 
Matched Subsidies Cost of Cost of 
construc- for house initial winter Total 
tion costs repair feeding feeding 
program program 
Pizhou 925.716 1,405.80 7,682.175 86,680.05 96,693.74 
Xiuqian 2,697.75 7,967.850 99,117.08 109,782.68 
Taoyuan 8,175.75 90,466.50 98,642.25 
Total 925.716 12,279.30 15,650.025 276,263.63 305,118.67 
Table 2 
Total planned expenditure was 305,000 TEUs, of which 12,000 
constituted subsidies for house repair, while the bulk of the resources 
would be for the winter feeding program. You may well ask how 
much these sums were worth by eighteenth-century standards, and 
one convenient comparison is with the total 'value' of each county 
to the state in terms of annual tax income. The available tax data for 
Pizhou and Xiuqian are diabolically complicated, and it is only after 
several weekends of Excel spreadsheets that I propose estimates for 
annual tax quotas as of 1746. Being cautious, I conclude only that the 
government was committing to flood relief much more than twice 
the gross income to which it was theoretically entitled each year from 
these counties. This munificence is the more remarkable in that, in 
1746, the entire province was enjoying a one-year respite from the 
most important category of tax, under a decision to celebrate the tenth 
anniversary of the emperor's accession by freeing all the nation's 
landowners from this tax for one year during 1746-48. 
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Approx. tax Resource Number of Commitment 
quota as of commitment relief-eligible (TEUs) per 
1746 (taels) (TEUs) victims victim 
Pizhou 35,000.00 96,693.741 348,746 0.277 
Xiuqian 33,000.00 109,782.675 265,750 0.413 
'laoyuan 98,642.25 219,894 0.449 
Total 305,118.661 834,390 0.366 
Table 3 
I now tum to three issues that are addressed in the correspondence 
collected in the casebook: were the landless to be eligible for assistance; 
how should officialdom react to peasant mobility following the floods; 
and what was the best way of ensuring supply continuity when need 
seemed likely to outstrip resources? We are now entering a realm that 
is familiar to anyone who has opinions about the theory and practice 
of the modem welfare state. In this case, an intense paternalism 
is shown to have been complemented, rather than subverted, by 
awareness of market forces and of the danger of abuse. 
The relief system was, in principle, designed for peasant farmers. 
What, therefore about the rural proletariat - and semi-proletarians 
whose meager livelihood was underpinned by tiny sums of capital? 
Should they be allowed to benefit? It is not the treatment of tenants 
that is in question here. Although, in this society, some might have 
thought that tenants, like slaves, should be fed by the landlord family 
in time of dearth, the firm decision, taken on pragmatic grounds, was 
that tenants - probably the majority of local farmers - would be fed 
by the state. The phrase 'the landless poor' in the casebook refers 
not to folk who rented all the land they tilled, but to hired labourers, 
itinerant traders, and economic specialists, such as fishermen. Local 
officialdom could not but recognise that, strictly speaking, such people 
should not have access to the relief program, but this made the more 
humane authorities uneasy. Let us first hear from the prefect who 
was in charge of two of our three counties. He noted in a letter to the 
intendant that, besides the peasants, 
54 
[There are] grass-cutters, fishermen, persoIls Whlll,l rry guuds (Ill shoulder-
poles or on their backs, not to mention those who depend entirely on hiring 
out their labor or eke a living out with petty capital: all these are members 
of the landless poor who have no constant means of livelihood. As soon 
as the cold winter comes, there is no more grass, and the rivers are frozen. 
As work has stopped, there is no way for them to sell their labour. Even 
if they have some handicraft skill or minor business, because their capital 
is small and their profits insignificant, it will be hard for them to support 
themselves into the ne.v year. These landless poor have therefore always 
been included in relief provision in the stricken villages where they reside, 
being entered in the accounts under the 'poor commoners' category. 
Unfortunately, this customary extension of the rules was now 
perceived to be in jeopardy, because of a bureaucratic jack-boot. In 
this province, a fair bit of discretion had been used in allocating food 
relief, with the result that the accounts had been repeatedly rejected 
by a central-government Board of Revenue that had an allergy to 
non-compliance with 'established regulations'. Horror of horrors, 
the province had been ordered to carry out its relief operations by 
the book in future. This would mean a new rigour in systematically 
linking the number of months for which each household would 
receive relief to the percentage disaster rating assigned to each 
field. But how could one then determine the entitlement of those 
who had no land to be assessed? The provincial administration did 
what university departments would do if they were ever cursed by 
blindness in the upper echelons with any similar dilemma, that is, turn 
to some conspicuously well-run department, say Italian Studies, and 
ask how they are handling the matter. The next-door province was 
no less a paragon, but alas, when the hand-copied dossier for its 1744 
relief campaign arrived, what did it say, in the usual bureaucratese, 
but: 
Given that relief issued according to the regulations extends only to 
households that have land, leaving the landless poor at serious risk of 
loosing their foothold, the relief operations of recent years have all been 
carried out according to expediency. 
However, it did seem that the next-door province was using 
village-level disaster ratings to determine relief entitlements for the 
landless poor, and then it turned out that, after all, there was a central-
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government ruling that not only legitimized but actually mandated 
a flexible interpretation of the rules. In 1740, a policy watchdog 
had pointed out that failure to extend relief to the landless would 
'inevitably' force them to take to the roads. The emperor had accepted 
a recommendation that, in future famines, local authorities be told not 
to distinguish between the landed and the landless poor, but to ensure 
that no disaster victim certified as 'poor' feJl through the safety net of 
state assistance. This was all very well, but unambiguous guidelines 
would have made it easier to deal with the Board of Revenue. The 
provincial administration commissioner proposed a commonsense 
procedure but suggested that it would be prudent to seek clarification 
from the Board. His insecurity is understandable, although unhelpful 
to the landless poor. 
I will deal briefly with the subsequent discussion as to how far 
compassion should go. There was a local precedent for extending 
relief at least to the 'widows, widowers and orphans' among the 
landless poor of unscathed villages. In view of the lowered capacity 
of normal patrons to hire labour and buy nonessentials in a famine 
year, should one go even further, and provide some relief to other 
landless residents of unscathed villages? The provincial leadership 
thought this too lavish, but it reaffirmed the logic as it applied to the 
landless poor of stricken villages. In one set of guidelines, landless 
labourers and landless people with a skill to sell were singled out as 
worthy of compassion. The earnings of the latter were very limited, 
and their post-flood opportunities still more so. As for labourers, 
there was 'no one to hire them.' 
What makes all this interesting is that it shows thoughtful concern 
with the predicament of marginal members of local communities 
- people who lacked the security even of tenancy but were still seen 
as industrious enough to be deserving. This portrayal contrasts 
with a crude dichotomy, in later rhetoric, between respectable 
landowning peasants and the vagabondish landless. But there is 
another contrast I would like to mention. On the one hand stand 
our practical administrators, who recognised the constrictions, in 
post-disaster winters, of the labour market and of the market for the 
goods and services of landless micro-entrepreneurs. On the other 
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stands the policy watchdog ,,,,ho, in 1743, had advocated that the 
state stockpile less grain in case of famine, and, in that context, had 
blithely suggested that silver distributed instead of grain could serve 
victims as petty trading capital. But let us now move to the second 
issue: what should the state do about flood victims like these who 
took to the roads to look for food. 
The Qing state had a system for caring for people who fled 
from famine; nice and concise in Chinese, the name tor it might be 
translated as '[system of] reception centres and assisted passage 
home'. This system was partly motivated by compassionate concern 
to stop people dying of hunger by the wayside - a humanitarianism 
most clearly shown in occasional voluntary subscription drives within 
officialdom to provide padded winter clothing for the temporary 
vagrants. However, there were less altruistic reasons for concentrating 
displaced peasant families in reception centres, feeding them until 
the early spring, and then having them escorted home, with money 
or food rations for the journey. 
The refugees for whom the system was intended are usually 
represented as peasant smallholders. The state did not want such 
people to leave their land at all: they were to be fed in their home 
villages until it was possible to plant the next year's crop, thus reviving 
the cycle of production out of which the taxes would be paid. It 
frustrated post-disaster planning if peasants wandered to seek food 
elsewhere just as the state was finalising preparations to feed them 
at home. Alas, however, as Pierre-Etienne Will has pointed out, the 
gaps in state provision might have been calculated to ensure that 
many would take to the roads.2 Physical displacement by the torrents, 
hunger, lack of confidence in, or knowledge of, the state's intentions, 
and ineligibility for relief would have driven off many residents, 
some of whom would move too far to 'hear that relief [was starting] 
and return' as the administration hoped. Rather than (a) risk the 
migrants becoming a law-and-order problem, and (b) jeopardise the 
springtime planting and the taxes, the state preferred to implement 
the system of reception centres and assisted passage home - in turn 
creating the danger that people who could expect nothing if they 
stayed at home would make sure that they qualified for refugee 
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assistance - or so it was alleged. 
During the 1740s, there were many complaints about the tiny 
travel grants as an incentive to unnecessary migration. By the end 
of the decade, the court had decided to abolish the whole system in 
its nominal existing form - as resettlement assistance for potentially 
productive able-bodied males and their families. In 1748 came an edict 
stigmatising beneficiaries as violence-prone swindlers so shameless 
as to turn migration for the sake of resettlement benefits into their 
constant means of livelihood. The scope of government assistance 
was subsequently narrowed to 'the elderly, the very young, women, 
and the disabled', who were not to be escorted home but simply 
provided with food rations for the journey. Despite some wavering, 
the abolition was confirmed in 1753 and reaffirmed a decade later. 
Although this lecture focuses on flood relief in 1746, I will now say 
a bit more about the abolitionist rhetoric of 1748-63, because it is 
through contrast that the attitudes expressed in 1746 gain much of 
their significance. 
The rhetoric of abolition was crude and dichotomising. On the one 
hand were the genuine refugees from famine: decent landowners, 
probably few in number because they valued their land too much 
to leave it, but who, if they should take to the roads, would be 
travelling purposefully, either in search of employment or to join 
relatives who could assist for the duration. On the other hand were 
the feckless, disreputable idlers, persons with no land to cherish 
and no compunction either about abusing state provision or about 
plundering the villages through which they passed. As the court put 
it in 1753: 
Although the petty folk may be in temporary difficulty over food, they 
ought naturally to wait calmly for relief. Those who set out with their 
dependants in all four directions are for the most part riffraff. They are 
certainly not respectable people who dwell content with their portion. 
The professed concern was not only that a system that rewarded its 
footloose abusers would tempt the solid peasantry into opportunistic 
migration. Another spectre raised was that the officious paternalism of 
the reception centers and repatriation escorts would hinder genuine 
famine refugees in their responsible quest for employment. The climax 
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came in 1763 when, despite expressed concern that refugees must 
be helped home to undertake the urgent work of draining fields, an 
edict not only pronounced that all such wanderers were landless, but 
also suggested that repatriation would be useless and oppressive for 
them too. The proper lot in life of landless people was to rove the 
four directions in search of opportunities to earn their food. What 
help was it to 'bind them and whip them on their [homeward] way, 
forcing on them what ... they cannot bear'? 
No doubt, in eighteenth-century China as in our world, government 
pronouncements had a certain efficacy in naturalising prejudicial 
stereotypes of welfare recipients. To return to our case study of flood 
relief in 1746, it is clear that the provincial authorities were concerned 
about abuses of the refugee assistance system - one directive even 
insinuated that the great majority of claimants were 'vagrants, roving 
beggars, and persons who have been away from home for years 
earning their food as hired labourers'. But a more measured discourse 
prevails in the casebook, one that recognised the danger of abuse 
and prescribed detailed countermeasures, while simultaneously 
embodying the same kind of sympathetic thoughtfulness as we have 
seen in the discussion of how landless victims should be treated. 
In one striking passage, the fact that poor people have taken to 
the roads is represented not as a sign of their short-sightedness or 
opportunism, but rather as a reflection of bad management on the 
part of local government. On 14 October, the intendant sent a sharp 
reprimand to the Pizhou magistrate because a patrolman had reported 
a party of over ten people of both sexes 'fleeing from famine'. The 
report had identified their home village, the official responsible for 
the relief-eligibility survey in that village, and the explanation that 
the wanderers had given. They had been absent when the village 
register of households was compiled; they were therefore without 
grain, and the collapse of their home left them no choice but to take to 
the roads. In other words, they were claiming to have been excluded 
from relief because their names were not on the register used as a 
checklist in the survey. What I want to stress is the intendant's alacrity 
in assuming the pizhou county government to be at fault. His nagging 
rhetoric conveyed a presumption of negligence. He cited another 
59 
report of refugees from the same area alleging underreporting of 
persons who were eligible for relief. This, he said, was clear evidence 
that post-disaster migration in Pizhou resulted from 'unsatisfactory 
management'. How could the Pizhou authorities have pitilessly 
left the wanderers to flee? Were they not in danger of betraying the 
magnanimous intent both of their superiors and of the emperor, with 
his concern that 'there should not be a single individual who does 
not find his place'? 
The concept of the common person's 'place' - his foothold that 
must not be lost - runs through the discourse of the refugee assistance 
system in its heyday. One defensible way of looking at that system, 
although not one I favour, is that it represents the government cleaving 
to an ideal of rural fixity that socioeconomic change had rendered 
out-of-date at least two hundred years before, and that the eighteenth-
century population boom was making even more unrealistic than it 
had been in the sixteenth century. Be that as it may, there is something 
rather impressive, given the vast number of people for whom relief 
was being planned, in the survival of another short report alerting 
the intendant that one Pizhou family of five and one of three had 
been found 'fleeing from famine', allegedly because their headman 
had refused to include them in the relief roster. The magistrate thus 
incurred an urgent directive to ascertain, 'immediately on receipt of 
this command', whether or not the wanderers had been wrongfully 
excluded. If so, he was to 'call them back' without delay, have them 
added to the relief roster, and report. The hierarchy, it seems, cared 
enough about that 'single individual' who might 'lose his place' to 
have created means by which his perilous position might be brought 
to the attention of superior authority. 
To understand the provincial leadership' s instructions for handling 
refugees who arrived in his jurisdiction, we must keep in mind the 
reasonable assumptions made: most arrivals would probably be 
from within the same province, or possibly the next-door one, and 
an expensive operation to feed them in their home communities was 
in preparation. The general approach, therefore, was to send the 
wanderers home whenever possible, and reserve reception-centre 
treatment for those who were not fit to travel. But let us look at a 
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set of guidelines that the intendant received un 21 October. These 
guidelines reflect preoccupation with the risk of abuse, and they 
considerably narrow eligibility for assistance, but they still recognise 
a range of circumstances that would justify intelligently differential 
treatment. 
According to the new instructions, when wanderers arrived in a 
jurisdiction, the authorities should first ascertain whether their home 
localities had been afflicted, and, if so, why they had not stayed there 
to receive relief. Those not from disaster areas were to be allowed 
to go home if they wished, but should not be assisted. Those from 
nearby disaster areas were not to be assisted either. Their own county 
authorities should be notified that they would be returning, so that 
they could have their status verified and receive relief if eligible. 
Assistance to go home should be reserved for those who not only 
claimed to be from relatively far-off stricken areas, but also manifested 
physical evidence of malnutrition, were accompanied by family 
dependants, appeared hard pressed by cold and hunger, and would 
not have been able to return without a cash allowance. These people 
would not be eligible for winter care in the reception centre: it would 
be the responsibility of the authorities of their home jurisdiction to 
ensure that, on return, they were included in the relief distribution. 
Exempt from mandatory return home but ineligible for assistance 
of any kind were able-bodied males who could support themselves 
through labour and were not accompanied by family dependants. 
Once such people had been so perverse as to leave their disaster-
stricken home communities, they forfeited the consideration given to 
the landless who remained at home. A person who exercised mobility 
could be deemed capable of moving into regions where disaster had 
not so depressed demand for labour as to make work impossible 
to find. Some of these people may not have been eligible for relief 
at home - they may have been from 'less poor' households, whose 
able-bodied males were expected to fend for themselves. 
This left for the reception centres not only the elderly, the sick, the 
disabled and 'those who would find it hard to travel in the winter's 
cold', but also able-bodied adult males who had come with their 
families over long distances, those with elderly parents who needed 
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a son's physical support in travelling, and those with sk~ \'.1, ,·s who 
needed care. In all such cases, provided that it was not practical to 
separate the able-bodied male from his dependants, the whole family 
was to be eligible for the classic program: food and shelter over the 
winter, and an assisted return home when spring arrived. The list of 
suitable beneficiary types is short, but it is worth reproducing because 
it seems to reflect its author's ability to think of famine refugees as 
real people. In Qing government directives, we do not often encounter 
wives as persons who might be physically in need of care from 
husbands. But the possibility would have occurred to officials who 
had thought seriously about what famine meant. 
I turn now to the third issue: how to ensure continuity of relief 
supplies when need seemed likely to outstrip resources. Hungry 
people need to eat, but what the authorities of the three counties had 
in store was mainly silver. The anticipated requirement for the winter 
feeding program totalled 276,000 tael-equivalent units (TEUs). Not 
long before the opening of relief, they had 189,000 TEUs on hand, but 
74 percent of that was in the form of silver. One bushel of unhusked 
rice was being deemed equivalent to one tael of silver, but there 
is reason to doubt whether the administration could have bought 
. bulk supplies of grain at that ideal, benchmark price in the last three 
months of 1746. We may, therefore, well ask whether the eligible 
families were really likely to receive relief in the form sanctioned by 
commonsense and long-standing tradition: uncooked grain. 
The same doubt arises yet more sharply if we jump to mid-February 
the following year, when the provincial authorities were budgeting for 
an extended relief period plus an extra monetary benefit for victims 
in the ten worst stricken counties. The new provincial administration 
commissioner estimated that, after using up the resources left over so 
far, the authorities in affected areas province-wide would need at least 
another 260,000 taels of silver and 299,000 bushels of husked rice. The 
silver was the easy part. The commissioner could assume that there 
were still unused relief funds in the prefectural treasuries, so all he 
had to do was allocate the sum required out of these funds, and order 
the responsible authorities to send the silver off to the flood-stricken 
counties. Rice was more problematic. The commissioner could see 
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his way to allocating a mere 24 percent of the amount required. Most 
of the balance would have to be provided in silver, from the salt 
tax. We can calculate that, in the total allocatiun of resources for the 
supplementary relief period, silver would predominate over rice in 
a ratio of more than 5:l. 
The assumption that silver and rice were interchangeable rested 
on the belief that one could give disaster victims silver in partial or 
even total substitution for gram. In this province, which was the must 
highly commercialised in China, it was thought safe to assume that 
merchant rice would be available on the markets of dearth-stricken 
regions, having been attracted by a combination of high prices and 
ease of transportation on a dense network of waterways. The key 
was therefore to ensure that peasants had the wherewithal to buy 
rice 'imports'. It is interesting that this assumption, arguably better 
suited to the richer counties further south, was made by officials 
discussing flood relief for the environmentally vulnerable north part 
of the province. 
It is not that the supply even of merchant rice was thought to 
be unfailing. Let us see how the provincial governor advised his 
subordinates before the winter feeding program started. Although 
the normal procedure, if one were issuing silver at all, would be 
to mix silver and grain consistently throughout the relief period, 
it would make good sense, he said, to issue silver in the ninth and 
tenth months of the lunar calendar, and either rice, or a mixture of 
rice and silver, in the eleventh and twelfth. The former two months 
were the immediate post-harvest season, and the harvest would be 
good that year both in those local villages that had escaped the floods 
and in more fortunate adjacent jurisdictions. 'With new rice entering 
the market and visiting merchants making their rounds, the price of 
grain is surely bound to fall in no time.' With the rain and snow of 
winter, by contrast, merchants might not continue to arrive, and grain 
prices would rise. It would be much better for the poor to receive rice 
from the authorities in such circumstances than in the post-harvest 
season when they could buy it cheaply. 
By the spring of 1747, the shortage of actual grain created tougher 
problems. There would be no point in issuing silver in the first 
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two lunar months, when grain wuuld be scarce on the markets. 
Distribution in silver would have to wait until the month before 
the early-summer wheat harvest, when prices would peak and the 
government would start making cut-price sales of special stockpiles, 
in a procedure called 'price-stabilising sales'. At this point, one's 
tone must change: no more calls to admire sensitive and thoughtful 
planning, because what emerges now is managerial expediency. 
Only those victims assessed as most in need should have assistance 
in the first two months; those assessed as needing only one month of 
relief must wait until the end of the third month (8 May) for doles of 
silver. Even in the first and second months, when there would be little 
grain to buy, household relief entitlements should be issued partly in 
silver if possible. While we may well ask what all this meant for those 
affected, it is worth reconstructing the rationale for saving grain so 
that it could be sold while market prices peaked, instead of given to 
the hungry in the spring. On the one hand, the annual pre-harvest 
peak of market prices would probably put grain out of the reach of 
many ordinary people who had not been disaster victims. One must 
have grain to sell to them in order to prevent food riots. On the other 
hand, if the state could get a decent return despite selling at less than 
market prices, there would be funds with which to rebuild the reserves 
when prices fell after the autumn harvest. One could not risk being 
caught with even fewer stocks next year. 
We will now stop eavesdropping and ask what lessons these 
overheard bureaucratic conversations may have for us today. I begin 
by noting that many a listener would pat the participants on the back 
for being 'surprisingly modern', or even regard their 'modernity' as 
the most interesting feature of the story. After all, these people thought 
rationally, and in secular terms. They were engaged in rational, 
quantitative planning. Implicit in their social welfare institutions 
were issues that we face today: paternalism versus self-reliance; 
welfare abuse; the negative stereotyping of welfare claimants and 
of dislocated persons. And if the individuals whom we have been 
observing were still operating uncritically in paternalistic mode, 
they also implemented relief distribution policies that would not 
have made sense without some basic consciousness of market forces 
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- even if they had no reason to pxpound that consciousness \'\'ith 
the sophistication that some of their contemporaries had shown. 
They did not reiterate the argument, made to the emperor in 1743, 
that boosting effective demand for grain by supplementing peasant 
incomes would attract commercial imports. However, their relative 
comfort with the counter-intuitive practice of distributing relief in 
monetary form would have been applauded by the foremost welfare 
economist of the late twentieth century.3 
The objection to the 'Weren't they modern!' way of thinking is not 
so much that to imagine that rationality is a defining characteristic 
of modernity flies in the face of modern history, betrays that naiVe 
post-Enlightenment belief in linear progress that is in full retreat 
throughout the Western academy, and reflects an absurd vanity on the 
part of us moderns. As Robert Hymes has shown, rational, market-
conscious thinking about famine relief policy had already been 
published in the Southern Song dynasty (1127-1279).4 The religion 
(superstition) / rationality dichotomy may have helped Europeans 
since Voltaire to make sense of the revolutionary changes taking place 
in Europe (and its overseas extensions), but we should not assume 
that it has the same value universally. 
However, to draw attention to the rationalism of a Han Feizi (d.233 
B.C.) or his teacher Xunzi would only be to make debating points. 
We can more easily recognize our Qing-dynasty officials as superb 
examplars of premodern rationality by asking what would be thought 
of a present-day government that sought to deal with the aftermath of 
catastrophic floods by relying solely on the organizational techniques 
of the eighteenth-century Sino-Manchu bureaucracy. More positively, 
we could ask how the mid-Qing relief managers could have obviated 
some of the dysfunctional expedients identified above, had their world 
only had access to modern means of transport and communication, 
modern agricultural inputs, modern pumping technology, perhaps 
even modern ways of keeping population records. In brief, although 
modern technology is not a panacea, nevertheless with helicopters, 
telecommunications, computers, higher agricultural productivity, 
power-driven pumps, and faster means of transporting grain in bulk, 
the relief managers could probably have saved more lives, allocated 
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resuurces more accurately and efficiently, eliminated the waiting 
periods that drove peasants to the roads, broadened the eligibility 
criteria, and had more choice as to whether to distribute relief in 
money or in kind. They had superbly rational organisational skills, 
but worked at a snail's pace by modern standards. With computers, 
e-mail, and perhaps an airborne courier service, those sets of guidelines 
that stand today as testimonies to their authors' thoughtfulness could 
have been drafted, critiqued, revised, approved, and disseminated to 
the field administration within hours, not weeks, thereby eliminating 
delay and confusion as subordinates awaited orders or made incorrect 
assumptions as to what the policy would be this year. 
To praise the managers for their 'modernity' is therefore to overlook 
the transformations in human capacity that have been brought about 
by the series of technological changes that began with the Industrial 
Revolution - or, to accept Jack Goldstone's refinement, that were 
inaugurated with the unprecedented application of steam power to 
industrial production in the 1830s.5 That for which the Qing flood-
relief managers should be praised is their successful harnessing of the 
premodern resources that were at their disposal to embody a far more 
significant commitment to the survival of the poor and vulnerable 
than was evinced by the New Orleans authorities (and higher echelons 
of the United States governmental hierarchy), despite the far more 
sophisticated technological resources available to the latter, in the 
hurricane-caused flood of 2005. To be sure, the comparison is unfair: 
what caused domestic outrage in the United States in 2005 (apart 
from the neglect of the environmental infrastructure that, if properly 
maintained, might have prevented the disaster in the first place) 
was the disorganised nature of the immediate official response to a 
calamity that had come as a shock, although in fact it was predictable. 
We have no evidence that the first few days and weeks of the Chinese 
floods of 1746 and 1747 were any less traumatic for their victims, or 
that the immediate official response was any better organised by 
mid-Qing standards. With this flaw acknowledged, the comparison 
is still overwhelmingly in favour of premodern China. Here was 
a government that planned in advance for natural disasters and 
devoted immense administrative and fiscal resources to managing 
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their aftermath. 
No one would suggest that the precise procedures used in 
eighteenth-century China should be wrenched from their historical 
context and applied in the contemporary United States. The 
paternalism of practices based on the concept of the villager's 'place' 
among the ancestral fields would seem oppressive in an age in which 
it is increasingly accepted that people like to find their own solutions 
when they can, and that preferred solutions may involve mobility. 
It is therefore dangerous even to say that what should be adopted is 
the 'spirit' of Qing-dynasty relief procedures. However, in a world 
in which socialism and the socialistic institutions of the welfare 
state have been increasingly eclipsed, it may be worth insisting that 
government commitment to the economic survival of the weakest 
members of society was institutionalised in China long before the 
foundation of the modern Western welfare state, to say nothing of the 
more radical reshapings of society in China after 1949. In other words, 
there is no need to banish the idea of some contextually appropriate, 
government provided safety net in the retreat from the perceived 
excesses of the so-called 'Mummy-Daddy state' or 'iron rice-bowl'. 
Whatever government self-interest may have underlain the ideal of 
preserving everybody's social foothold, its translation into relatively 
effective famine relief practice will have made eighteenthccentury 
China a more truly' civilised' society than those that lacked such 
practice. What forms of safety net may be appropriate in different 
contemporary societies East and West is open to discussion. The 
point is that the concept antedates socialism and could survive its 
eclipse. 
What is civilisation? Mohandas Gandhi defined it not in terms of 
poetry or architectural wonders, but very simply: 'Civilization is that 
mode of conduct which points out to man the path of duty.'6 This 
definition has its problems: what, I wonder, is the duty of a nihilist, 
and what 'mode of conduct' would instruct him in it? However, in 
its original context, as part of an argument that India had 'nothing 
to learn' about civilisation from the continent that gave the world 
the factory and the machine gun, the simple statement has immense 
rhetorical effectiveness. Perhaps it can still shock us usefully today. 
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Talk of' duty' in quotidian Anglo-Saxon political discourse often has 
a conservative, authoritarian ring: citizens should think less about 
their rights and more about their duties. What is attractive about 
Confucianism as a political philosophy is that it emphasises duty as 
the guiding principle not so much of subjects as of rulers. To be sure, 
an over-developed sense of responsibility on the part of individual or 
collective rulers is conducive to paternalism. But there are different 
kinds of father. 
In a thoughtful essay, Sumner Twiss has pointed out that there is 
no need to regard 'human rights' as a Western conceptual monopoly, 
for a number of 'Third World' and other non-Western viewpoints 
have contributed to three 'generations (types) of human rights': the 
predominantly 'civil-political rights' that are most easily linked to 
Western liberalism, the 'socio-economic rights' associated with 1970s 
critiques of 'exploitation' and colonialism, and the 'developmental-
collective rights' 'emerging [in the 1990s] amidst Third and Fourth 
World claims for global redistribution of power, wealth, and the 
common heritage of humankind (e.g., ecosystem, peace)'. These 
three 'generations' have enriched each other, leading to creative 
reinterpretations of the potential of each? The resulting amalgam 
is far more welcoming to diverse cultural traditions than anyone 
'generation' would have been alone. Twiss argues that there are 
multiple points of contact between the three 'generations' and the 
Confucian tradition. He points out that a Confucian, or more precisely 
Mencian, understanding of human nature, voiced by the Chinese 
delegate to the conference that drafted the 1948 'Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights', influenced the wording of that charter's opening 
statement about human beings.8 
To the extent that the Confucian tradition has a particular affinity 
for the 'socio-economic' class of rights, one can only encourage its 
twenty-first century inheritors to keep up the pressure. It is not so 
much that Confucianism has so many compatibilities with human 
rights that it could 'justify internally its agreement to participate in 
an international human rights consensus'.9 Rather, establishing its 
coparcener status in the global human rights discussion would be 
one way for China to playa resurgent role in the twenty-first century 
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world order. If it proved able to expand support for socio-economic 
rights within the 'international human rights consensus', this might 
prove beneficial both for poor countries, and for those rich countries 
in which socialist traditions are marginal or have become so. At the 
same time, a clearer willingness on the part of Western governments 
to welcome non-Western contributions to global human rights 
discussion might help to defuse the resentment of Western hypocrisy 
and arrogance that undermines well-meaning Western criticisms of 
non-Western human rights performance and helps to sustain the 
violence of contemporary international relations. Much might, in 
short, be gained from mutual remonstrance based on an eclectic, 
jointly built philosophy of human rights. Humility before the highest 
standards of responsible Confucian governance would be of benefit 
in any place where individuals are neglected, tortured, or oppressed 
- including, of course, China. 
This, then, is the Chinese lesson for New Orleans (and elsewhere): 
that the subaltern-class 'individual' who might 'lose' his/her 
present' foothold' in society matters, and that recognition of his / her 
importance should be embodied in intelligent measures to provide 
whatever protections may be best planned, coordinated and/ or 
supplied by government, be it local, regional, or national. What these 
measures may be varies with context, but in a world of gathering 
ecological crisis, maintenance of the environmental infrastructure, 
where possible, is basic. Where it can be seen that no amount of 
civil engineering can stave off disaster in the medium term, disaster 
planning is the last recourse of responsible government. The 1746 
Sino-Manchu bureaucracy could serve as inspiration. 
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